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LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 Hypothetical neural mechanism of confidence computation. Based 
on prior literature, we postulated the following neural mechanism for 
the roles of DLPFC and aPFC in confidence computation. DLPFC 
reads out the strength of the sensory signal and relays it to aPFC. On 
the other hand, aPFC translates this readout into a confidence 
judgment after incorporating additional non-perceptual factors. The 
strength of the sensory signal that is read out by DLPFC on a 
particular trial is related to the level of confidence on that trial. On 
average, better quality readouts convey that more evidence was 
available for the perceptual decision, which aPFC translates into 
higher confidence ratings. Therefore, impaired DLPFC functioning 
leading to poor quality readouts would convey that the sensory 
information was more ambiguous than it really is and would result 
in lower confidence ratings. In contrast, impaired aPFC functioning 
would alter how aPFC transforms the sensory readout relayed from 
DLPFC into a confidence judgement and, therefore, alter 
metacognitive performance. 
5 
Figure 2 Task. (A) Trial sequence. Each trial began with short fixation (500 
ms) followed by the presentation of an oriented Gabor patch (100 
ms). Subjects had to simultaneously indicate the tilt (left/right) of the 
Gabor patch and their confidence on a 1-4 scale. (B) Timeline of 
TMS delivery. TMS was given as a train of three pulses with inter-
pulse interval of 100 ms. The first pulse was delivered 250 ms after 
onset of the stimulus. Subjects had a mean response time of ~950 
ms. 
20 
Figure 3 TMS effect on overall confidence level. TMS to DLPFC decreased 
average confidence while TMS to aPFC did not affect the overall 
confidence level. The left error bars represent the within-subject 
standard errors for comparisons with S1 (the error bar for S1 is the 
same as the one for DLPFC) and are indicative of statistical 
significance. The right error bars represent the between-subject 
standard errors and are not indicative of the statistical significance 
(instead, they show the overall variability in confidence across 
subjects). n.s. not significant, ** P < 0.01. 
22 
Figure 4 TMS effect on metacognitive ability. TMS to aPFC increased 
metacognitive ability for the second half, compared to the first half, 
of test blocks. No such effect was observed for S1 TMS or DLPFC 
TMS. Metacognitive ability was operationalized as Mratio 
24 
 vi 
(Maniscalco and Lau, 2012). ∆Mratio is the change in Mratio from 
the first half to the second half of a block. The left error bars 
represent the within-subject standard errors for comparisons with S1 
(the error bar for S1 is the same as the one for aPFC) and are 
indicative of statistical significance. The right error bars represent 
the within-subject standard errors for comparisons between the first 
half and second half of blocks and are not indicative of the statistical 
significance. n.s. not significant, * P < 0.05. 
Figure 5 A computational model of confidence generation. (A) The sensory 
signal (𝐫𝐬𝐞𝐧𝐬) available at the decision level is read out (𝐫𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐨𝐮𝐭) to 
the metacognitive level and additional noise (𝛔𝐦𝐞𝐭𝐚) is added before 
obtaining the confidence signal (𝐫𝐦𝐞𝐭𝐚). The perceptual decision is 
based on the sensory signal 𝐫𝐬𝐞𝐧𝐬, while the confidence judgment is 
based on the confidence signal 𝐫𝐦𝐞𝐭𝐚. Consistent with the 
hypothesized roles of DLPFC and aPFC in confidence computation, 
we modelled the effect of DLPFC TMS as a signal loss from the 
readout (quantified as 𝚫𝐫𝐬𝐞𝐧𝐬), and the effect of aPFC TMS as 
lowered metacognitive noise (quantified as 𝚫𝛔𝐦𝐞𝐭𝐚). (B-C) Model 
simulations show that decreasing the magnitude of the readout 
decreases the overall confidence level (panel B) but does not 
influence metacognitive ability (panel C). Conversely, decreasing 
the amount of metacognitive noise in the second half of test blocks 
has a small effect on average confidence (panel B) but a large effect 
on increasing metacognitive ability difference between the first and 
second half of blocks (panel C). These results mirror the effects of 
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Visual metacognition depends on regions within the prefrontal cortex. Two areas 
in particular have been repeatedly implicated: the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) 
and the anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC). However, it is still unclear what the function of 
each of these areas is and how they differ from each other. To establish the specific roles 
of DLPFC and aPFC in metacognition, we employed online transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) to causally interfere with their functioning during confidence 
generation. Human subjects from both sexes performed a perceptual decision-making task 
and provided confidence ratings. We found a clear dissociation between the two areas: 
DLPFC TMS lowered confidence ratings, whereas aPFC TMS increased metacognitive 
ability but only for the second half of the experimental blocks. These results support a 
functional architecture where DLPFC reads out the strength of the sensory evidence and 
relays it to aPFC, which makes the confidence judgement by potentially incorporating 
additional, non-perceptual information. Indeed, simulations from a model that incorporates 
these putative DLPFC and aPFC functions reproduced our behavioral results. These 
findings establish DLPFC and aPFC as distinct nodes in a metacognitive network and 






CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Metacognition, or the ability to assess the quality of our decisions, is crucial for 
effective decision making (Metcalfe and Shimamura, 1994; Koriat, 2007). However, 
despite the critical influence of metacognition on our actions and decisions (Nelson and 
Narens, 1990; Shimamura, 2000a; Koriat, 2007; Fleming et al., 2012a; Yeung and 
Summerfield, 2012), its neural bases are still not fully elucidated (Shimamura, 2000a; 
Fleming et al., 2012b). 
1.1 What is Metacognition? 
Cognitive processes such as perceptual decision making can be divided into those 
that occur at the object level and those that occur at the meta level. For example, in a 
discrimination task, we use the available information not only to discriminate between 
different classes of stimuli (object level process) but also to form judgements about our 
own responses (meta level process) such as how likely we are to be correct. This 
metacognitive ability guides the future course of our actions by telling us whether to act 
immediately on a decision or to gather more information and update our current 
understanding of the environment (Nelson and Narens, 1990; Shimamura, 2000a; Koriat, 





1.2 How is it Measured? 
Studies of metacognitive processes involve measures such as the average level of 
subjective confidence ratings and metacognitive efficiency. Average confidence ratings 
indicate the overall bias of the observer and does not necessarily correlate with accuracy 
(Koriat, 2011). For example, subjects can be over- or under-confident (Harvey, 1997). This 
measure is typically referred to as “confidence calibration” (Baranski and Petrusic, 1994). 
Metacognitive efficiency, on the other hand, is a measure that evaluates the quality of the 
observer’s metacognitive processes (Fleming and Lau, 2014). It measures the observer’s 
ability to discriminate between their own correct and incorrect responses. In other words, 
an observer who is metacognitively efficient would show a high degree of correlation 
between confidence and accuracy. This measure is typically referred to as “confidence 
resolution”(Baranski and Petrusic, 1994). 
 
1.3 The Neural Basis of Metacognition 
An important question that arises from these studies is how the brain computes these 
metacognitive ratings. The overwhelming evidence points to a role of the prefrontal cortex. 
 
1.3.1 Prefrontal Cortex (PFC) 
Early studies investigating the neural basis of metacognition have looked at 
neuropsychiatric cases where metacognition is impaired. Shimamura, (2000a) reviewed 
studies that reported deficits in metacognitive abilities in patients with frontal lobe damage. 
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In one study, (Shimamura and Squire, 1986) patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, but not 
other amnesiacs, showed poor correlation between their feeling-of-knowing ratings and 
their subsequent performance on a recognition test. This selective metacognitive 
impairment was attributed to damage to the frontal cortex, and shown to not necessarily be 
a feature of amnesia. A later study (Janowsky et al., 1989), also found the same kind of 
deficit in patients with frontal lobe lesions without amnesia. A review by David et al., 
(2012) examined metacognitive function in patients with schizophrenia and found that they 
had lower activity in the anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC) during self-reflection as 
compared to controls. 
 
1.3.2 Subregions of PFC 
1.3.2.1 Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) 
Activity in DLPFC has been linked to the level of reported confidence. Indeed, 
studies employing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have consistently shown 
that activity within DLPFC tracks confidence levels during metacognitive computations 
(Fleck, et al., 2005; Henson et al., 2000; Lau & Passingham, 2006; Morales,et al., 2017). 
1.3.2.2 Anterior Prefrontal Cortex (aPFC) 
 On the other hand, aPFC has been specifically linked to subjects’ 
metacognitive ability. For example, structural imaging studies have found that grey matter 
volume in aPFC correlates with individual metacognitive ability (Fleming et al., 2010; 
Yokoyama et al., 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013; Allen et al., 2017). Similarly, studies using 
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fMRI show that aPFC activity is modulated by the reliability of confidence judgments 
(Yokoyama et al., 2010; Fleming et al., 2012b; Morales et al., 2017). Finally, metacognitive 
scores are affected by both lesions (Fleming et al., 2014) and transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (Rahnev et al., 2016; Ryals et al., 2016) to aPFC.  
 
1.4 A Hypothetical Neural Mechanism for Metacognitive Computation 
Although previous research has identified DLPFC and aPFC as critical to 
metacognitive computations, we still lack a mechanistic understanding of their functions 
in confidence judgments (Shimamura, 2000a; Fleming and Dolan, 2012). Based on the 
findings above, we hypothesized specific functions for DLPFC and aPFC in confidence 
computation.  We propose that DLPFC reads out the strength of the sensory signal and 
relays it to aPFC. The readout of the sensory signal determined by DLPFC conveys how 
much information was available for the sensory decision. aPFC subsequently integrates 
this readout with additional, non-perceptual factors and translates all this information into 
a confidence judgment (Figure 1). Disrupted readout of the sensory signal by DLPFC 
would, on average, convey that less information was available for the sensory decision. In 
turn, aPFC would translate such disrupted readout into lower confidence ratings. This 
architecture is consistent with prior findings since reading out the sensory signal strength 
would link DLPFC activity with confidence level, while making the confidence judgment 
would link aPFC activity with metacognitive ability. In addition, (Fleming et al., 2012b) 
observed that connectivity between aPFC and DLPFC increased during metacognitive 
 5 




Figure 1. Hypothetical neural mechanism of confidence computation. Based on 
prior literature, we postulated the following neural mechanism for the roles of 
DLPFC and aPFC in confidence computation. DLPFC reads out the strength of the 
sensory signal and relays it to aPFC. On the other hand, aPFC translates this 
readout into a confidence judgment after incorporating additional non-perceptual 
factors. The strength of the sensory signal that is read out by DLPFC on a 
particular trial is related to the level of confidence on that trial. On average, better 
quality readouts convey that more evidence was available for the perceptual 
decision, which aPFC translates into higher confidence ratings. Therefore, impaired 
DLPFC functioning leading to poor quality readouts would convey that the sensory 
information was more ambiguous than it really is and would result in lower 
confidence ratings. In contrast, impaired aPFC functioning would alter how aPFC 
transforms the sensory readout relayed from DLPFC into a confidence judgement 







Reads out sensory signal 
strength & relays to aPFC
Makes the confidence 
judgment
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1.5 Experimental Setup and Findings 
We tested our hypothesis regarding the putative functions of DLPFC and aPFC in 
confidence computation by employing online transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). 
Previous TMS studies on visual metacognition (Rahnev et al., 2016; Rounis et al., 2010; 
Ryals et al., 2016) used offline approaches that inhibit activity for an extended period of 
time. These studies showed little or no modulation of overall confidence level presumably 
because subjects had time to re-calibrate their confidence judgments. To address this issue, 
we applied online TMS in short blocks to avoid behavioral compensation. 
Based on our hypothesis about the functions of DLPFC and aPFC, we predicted that 
TMS to DLPFC would affect subjects’ overall confidence level, while TMS to aPFC would 
affect metacognitive ability. The results confirmed these predictions: TMS to DLPFC 
decreased confidence, whereas TMS to aPFC increased metacognitive ability but only for 
the second half of blocks. Further, we confirmed that these results can be reproduced by a 
computational model in which TMS to DLPFC affected the readout of the sensory 
information, while aPFC TMS affected the noise within the metacognitive computation 
itself. Our findings demonstrate that DLPFC and aPFC have distinct functions in visual 






CHAPTER 2. METHODS 
2.1 Subjects 
A total of 21 subjects completed the study (13 females and 8 males, average age = 
22 years, age range = 18-32 years). Three subjects were excluded from analyses. For one 
subject, the sensors registering the subject’s brain to their MRI shifted mid-session, which 
likely resulted in imprecise TMS target localization. The other two subjects were excluded 
due to poor performance or excessive number of interruptions due to discomfort. All 
subjects were right handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
 
2.2 Session Sequence 
We collected data for our experiment over two sessions, which were held on separate 
days. By dividing data collection into two days, we were able to collect more data while 
keeping the session short enough to avoid fatigue.  
Day 1 started with a short training on the behavioral task, followed by a staircasing 
procedure used to identify the contrast of the stimulus to be used for the main experiment. 
After subjects completed the staircasing, we determined the amplitude of TMS stimulation 
to use and started the main experiment.  
The main experiment consisted of four runs of three blocks each. For each of the 
three blocks within each run, we stimulated one of three regions – dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC), anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC), or the somatosensory cortex (S1; which 
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served as the control site) – in a pseudo-random order such that all the three sites were 
stimulated once within each run. The first run was a practice run and was shorter than the 
others. It was included to accustom subjects to receiving TMS to the different brain regions 
and minimize chances of the TMS pulse evoking a startle response during the main trials. 
The blocks from the practice run consisted of 16 trials each and were excluded from further 
analyses. All other blocks consisted of 40 trials each. Therefore, subjects completed a total 
of 408 trials during each session. 
During Day 1, subjects underwent a behavioral training procedure without TMS. The 
training session started with high stimulus contrast values (40%) and gradually presented 
lower contrast values (the last block included contrast values of 4%). Subjects were given 
trial-by-trial feedback on their performance during this training period.  
At the end of the training, subjects completed a 3-down-1-up staircasing procedure 
consisting of trials without feedback. The 3-down-1-up procedure is a variant of the up-
down transformed response method used for adaptive estimation of stimulus thresholds  
(Macmillan and Creelman 2005). This procedure yielded a contrast value for the stimulus 
(mean = 6.64% and SD = 0.96%) that was expected to result in an accuracy of 79% 
(Macmillan and Creelman 2005; observed mean = 79.6% and SD = 5.8%). We used the 
contrast value obtained from this procedure for the rest of the experiment. 
Day 2 was identical to Day 1 except that subjects did not have to undergo behavioral 




Each trial began with subjects fixating on a small white dot (size = 0.05˚) at the center 
of the screen for 500 ms followed by presentation of the stimulus for 100 ms. The stimulus 
was a Gabor patch (diameter = 3˚) oriented either to the right (clockwise, 45˚) or to the left 
(counterclockwise, 135˚) of the vertical and was superimposed on a noisy background. 
Subjects’ task was to determine the orientation of the Gabor patch while simultaneously 
rating their confidence on a 4-point scale (where 1 corresponds to the lowest confidence 
rating and 4 corresponds to the highest confidence rating) via a single key press. Subjects 
placed their fingers of each hand on a standard keyboard. The four fingers of the left hand 
were mapped to the four confidence responses for the left-tilted stimulus, while the four 
fingers of the right hand were mapped to the four confidence responses for the right-tilted 
stimulus. For each hand, the index finger indicated a confidence of 1, while the little (pinky) 
finger indicated a confidence of 4. The orientation of the stimulus (left/right) was chosen 
randomly on each trial. 
We delivered TMS on each trial as a train of three pulses delivered 250, 350, and 
450 ms after stimulus onset. We chose this timing so that it coincides with the presumed 
time window of confidence computation. While there is no clear data on the precise time 
window when confidence is computed, neuronal recordings from monkeys suggest that the 
discrimination response emerges ~200 ms following stimulus onset (Siegel et al., 2015), 
placing confidence computation in human PFC no earlier than 200 ms. To estimate the 
length of the time window, we collected pilot data from an identical discrimination task 
where subjects made two responses: their first response indicated the tilt (left/right) of the 
Gabor patch and their second response indicated their confidence level on a 4-point scale.  
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Analysis of these data showed that subjects typically take ~500 ms to give their confidence 
response, following the discrimination response. After roughly accounting for motor 
preparation (~200 ms), we estimated that the actual duration of confidence computation is 
about 300 ms. Based on this estimation, we timed our TMS pulses so that they targeted a 
time window that started 250 ms following stimulus onset and spanned the next 200 ms.  
 
2.4 Apparatus 
Stimuli were generated using Psychophysics Toolbox in MATLAB (MathWorks). 
During the training and the main experiment, subjects were seated in a dim room and were 
positioned 60 cm away from the computer screen (21.5-inch display, 1920 x 1080 pixel 
resolution, 60 Hz refresh rate). 
 
2.5 Defining ROIs for TMS Targeting  
We defined three sites as targets for TMS: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), 
anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC) and the somatosensory cortex (S1; control site). Based 
on previous studies (Fleming et al., 2010, 2012b; Yokoyama et al., 2010; Rahnev et al., 
2016), aPFC was localized at [28, 56, 26]. We localized DLPFC immediately posterior to 
aPFC (at a distance of 2.6 cm posterior to aPFC) and used [28, 30, 38] as the target 
coordinates. For S1, we used [20, -39, 70] as the putative coordinates (Rahnev et al., 2016) 
but the actual location of stimulation was adjusted based on S1’s known anatomical 
location in the postcentral gyrus. As in previous work (Rahnev et al., 2016), all regions 
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were defined in the right hemisphere because the right hemisphere is dominant for visual 
processing (Hellige, 1996).  
We defined the ROIs on the anatomical MRI scans of each subject. These scans were 
obtained during previous studies conducted in the lab. In order to determine the subject-
specific location for stimulation, we back-normalized the coordinates above to the subject’s 
native space. We created ROIs as 5-mm spheres and their centers were set as targets to 
guide the placement of the TMS coil. In some cases, the ROIs produced via back-
normalization appeared shifted with respect to the expected anatomical location. In such 
cases, we switched to an alternate method of defining ROI locations. The neural navigator 
software, TMSNavigator (Localite), contains a built-in program for defining a Talairach 
coordinate system on a subject’s MRI that is based on the location of the anterior 
commissure, the posterior commissure, and the vertex. After these structures are manually 
identified on an MRI scan, the software generates a Talairach grid, which can be adjusted 
so that it encloses the whole brain. This grid allows transformation of coordinates between 
the subject’s native coordinate space and the MNI coordinate space. 
 
2.6 TMS Setup 
TMS was delivered with a magnetic stimulator (MagPro R100, MagVenture), using 
a figure of eight coil with a diameter of 75 mm.  
We determined the resting motor threshold (RMT), immediately prior to starting the 
main experiment. In order to localize the motor cortex, we marked its putative location and 
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applied supra-threshold single pulses around that location. We determined the location of 
the right motor cortex as the region that induced maximal twitches of the fingers in the left 
hand. Then, using this location as the target, we determined the RMT using an adaptive 
parameter estimation by sequential testing (PEST) procedure (Borckardt et al., 2006). For 
three subjects, we were unable to reliably estimate RMT, even at amplitudes as high as 80. 
Therefore, for these subjects we chose to determine the active motor threshold (AMT) 
instead, which is lower than RMT and could be found reliably. Motor thresholding was 
done separately for both days (average for Day 1 = 59.94, average for Day 2 = 58.28), to 
control for non-specific factors, which can influence the TMS response (Ridding and 
Ziemann, 2010). 
The TMS coil was positioned on the previously-defined ROIs using a neural 
navigation system (TMS Navigator, Localite). The coil was oriented tangential to the skull 
and in such a way that the magnetic field induced was orthogonal to the skull. Stimulation 
was delivered at 90% of the individual resting motor threshold (RMT). In some cases when 
the stimulation intensity was uncomfortable to the subject, it was reduced to ~85% (2 
subjects) or ~80% (3 subjects) of RMT depending on the individual’s comfort level. No 
arm or leg movements were elicited by stimulation of any of the three sites.  
 
2.7 Analyses 
We analyzed the data for two separate measures: average confidence and 
metacognitive ability. To compute the average confidence, we simply calculated the 
average of all confidence ratings within each TMS condition. We quantified metacognitive 
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ability using the measure Mratio developed by Maniscalco & Lau (2012). Mratio is derived 
from signal detection theoretical modeling of the observer’s decision and confidence 
responses. It is the ratio of two measures – the observer’s metacognitive sensitivity (meta-
d’ – ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect responses) and the observer’s 
stimulus sensitivity (d’ – ability to discriminate between the two stimulus classes). The 
ratio of meta-d’ to d’ factors out the contribution of stimulus sensitivity towards 
metacognitive performance and captures the efficiency of the observer’s metacognitive 
processes (Fleming and Lau, 2014).  
We compared the effect of TMS on confidence and metacognitive ability between 
the three TMS conditions (DLPFC, aPFC and S1) using one-way repeated measures 
ANOVAs.  Additionally, we analyzed the interaction between time (within a block) and 
TMS location by splitting each block into first (trials 1-20) and second (trials 21-40) halves 
and performing a 2-way repeated measures ANOVA. Direct comparisons between regions 
were made using paired t-tests.  
 
2.8 Computational Modeling of Confidence Generation  
2.8.1 General Model Architecture 
Our results showed that TMS to each prefrontal site affected one specific aspect of 
confidence ratings – either their average value or their reliability in predicting accuracy. 
Our neural mechanism implies that the change in average confidence was due to TMS 
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affecting the readout of the sensory signal and the change in metacognitive ability was 
caused by TMS affecting the efficiency of the metacognitive evaluation.  
To assess our proposed neural mechanism, we performed simulations of a 
confidence generation model that incorporated our hypothesized TMS effects. It should be 
noted that we could not use previous approaches such as the existing procedure for 
estimating metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’), which is built on a signal detection 
theoretical (SDT) framework for modeling perceptual decisions (Maniscalco and Lau, 
2012). The reason is that although this procedure allows for the estimation of metacognitive 
performance, it is not a generative model and does not specify how the confidence data 
actually come about. On the other hand, to simulate confidence data, we needed a 
generative model. We sought to build a generative model that preserves the assumptions 
of SDT (Green and Swets, 1966) at the level of the perceptual decisions but also allows us 
to explicitly model the transformations to the sensory signal that are responsible for 
generating the confidence ratings. The simplest way to model the transformation of the 
sensory signal at the metacognitive level is to postulate the existence of metacognitive 
noise that corrupts the sensory signal as done previously by the creators of the meta-d’ 
measure (Maniscalco and Lau, 2014), us (Rahnev et al., 2016; Bang et al., 2017) and others 
(Mueller and Weideman, 2008; Jang et al., 2012; De Martino et al., 2013; van den Berg et 
al., 2017).  
Our generative model assumes that perceptual decisions and confidence ratings are 
the result of a hierarchical process consisting of two levels: an object level, which generates 
the discrimination response, and a meta level, which generates the confidence response. At 
the object level, the presented stimulus produces a sensory response corrupted by Gaussian 
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noise. We modeled the two Gaussian distributions arising from the two stimulus classes 
(left/right tilted Gabor patches) such that the left-tilted stimuli produce a sensory response 









2 ). Note that the distance between these distributions is µ and the stimulus 
sensitivity can be expressed as: 𝑑′ =
µ
𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠
. A copy of this sensory response, 𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 , gets 
transferred to the meta level as a readout of the sensory signal strength, 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡, where it 
is further corrupted by metacognitive Gaussian noise such that the metacognitive response 
is given by the formula 𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 = 𝑁(𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡 , 𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎
2 ). 
To simulate how subjects make perceptual and confidence responses on each trial, 
we specified a decision criterion, 𝑐0, and confidence criteria,  
𝑐−𝑛, 𝑐−𝑛+1, … , 𝑐−1, 𝑐1, … , 𝑐𝑛−1, 𝑐𝑛, where n is number of ratings on the confidence scale 
(in our case, n = 4). The criteria 𝑐𝑖 were monotonically increasing with 𝑐−𝑛 = −∞ and 
𝑐𝑛 = ∞.  
The object-level decisions were made based on a comparison of 𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 with 𝑐0. For 
trials in which 𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 > 𝑐0, the response was given as “right;” otherwise, the response given 
was “left.” Confidence responses were based on 𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 such that values falling within the 
interval [𝑐𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖+1) resulted in a confidence of 𝑖 + 1, when 𝑖 ≥ 0 and confidence of – 𝑖, when 
𝑖 ≤ −1, where 𝑖 takes integer values ranging from -4 to 3. In cases in which 𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 and 𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 
fell on different sides of the decision criterion 𝑐0, we constrained the confidence response 
to equal 1. 
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Finally, our data showed the existence of small (and non-significant) decrease in 
Mratio for the second half of blocks in the S1 and DLPFC TMS conditions. This effect 
parallels recent findings that metacognitive ability may decrease in second half of blocks 
due to fatigue (Maniscalco et al., 2017). To model this effect, we allowed meta to increase 
in the second half of all blocks by a value controlled by the parameter ∆meta_base.  
Our computational model can be related to our hypothesized neural mechanism 
about the roles of DLPFC and aPFC in confidence computation. According to the neural 
mechanism that we proposed, the sensory signal strength is read out by DLPFC. Here, we 
model 𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 , as the sensory signal produced at the object level. Under normal conditions 
(no TMS), the readout of this sensory signal by DLPFC, 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡, will equal 𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠  and will 
be relayed to aPFC for the confidence judgment. Further, our neural mechanism postulates 
that the role of aPFC is to integrate the strength of the sensory signal relayed by DLPFC 
with non-perceptual cues and make the confidence judgement. Within our model, this 
process can be seen as the addition of metacognitive noise meta at the meta level. 
 
2.8.2 Modelling TMS effects 
According to our proposed neural mechanism, TMS to DLPFC should influence 
the magnitude of sensory readout that can be used at the meta level. Our data showed that 
confidence level decreases following DLPFC TMS, suggesting that the sensory readout 
decreases in magnitude. We formalized this idea in our computational model as DLPFC 




𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 + ∆𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 , if 𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 < 0
𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 − ∆𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 , if 𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 ≥ 0
 
 
where ∆𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 controls the change in the readout. These conditions satisfy the relation 
|𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡| = |𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠| − ∆𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 such that the effect of TMS is to reduce the absolute 
magnitude of 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡 without changing its sign. (As stated above, in cases in which 𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 
and 𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 had a different sign – which occurs when |𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠| < ∆𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 – we constrained the 
confidence response to equal 1 by setting  𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 0.) On the other hand, according to 
our proposed neural mechanism, TMS to aPFC should affect the level of noise that corrupts 
the confidence decision. We formalized this idea in our model as aPFC TMS leading to an 
altered level of metacognitive noise. Since our behavioral results suggested that aPFC TMS 
increased metacognitive scores only in the second half of blocks, we modeled the effect of 
aPFC TMS as a decrease in metacognitive noise for the second half of blocks such that 
𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 = 𝑁(𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡 , (𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 − ∆𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎)
2), where ∆𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 controls the change of the 
metacognitive noise.  
To simulate actual data, we set the basic parameters of the model such that µ =
1.74, 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 = 1, 𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 = 0.6, 𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 = 0.15, 𝑐−3 =  −1.45, 𝑐−2 = −.95, 𝑐−1 =
−.45, 𝑐0 = 0, 𝑐1 =  .45, 𝑐2 = 0.95, and 𝑐3 = 1.45 . We set 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 = 1 since choosing other 
values would simply lead to a multiplicative change in all other parameters. The value of 
µ was chosen based on the average 𝑑′ observed across all subjects. The values for the rest 
of the parameters were chosen to match the overall performance that we observed in the 
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study. However, the effects of TMS do not depend on the specific numbers and the same 
qualitative results were observed with a wide range of values of the different parameters. 
Critically, we used different values of ∆rsens and ∆meta for modeling the different TMS 
conditions. For S1 TMS, we set ∆𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 = 0 and ∆𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 = 0. For modeling DLPFC TMS, 
we set ∆𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠  = 0.072 and ∆𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 = 0, consistent with the notion that DLPFC TMS should 
lead to a decrease in the magnitude of the sensory readout for metacognition. Finally, for 
modeling aPFC TMS, we set ∆𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠 = 0 and ∆𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎= 0.65, consistent with the notion that 
aPFC TMS should change the metacognitive noise. 
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CHAPTER 3. RESULTS 
We investigated the specific contributions of DLPFC and aPFC to visual metacognition by 
e employing an online TMS protocol to disrupt activity within these areas during 
confidence computation. Subjects indicated the tilt (left/right) of a noisy Gabor patch while 
simultaneously providing a confidence rating on a four-point scale (Figure 2A). On each 
trial, we delivered a train of three TMS pulses (Figure 2B) to DLPFC, aPFC, or S1 (which 
served as a control site). 
As in previous studies on the role of prefrontal cortex in perceptual decision making 
(Rahnev et al., 2016; Rounis et al., 2010; Ryals et al., 2016), TMS did not influence the 
overall task performance as measured by accuracy or reaction time (p > 0.05 for all pairwise 
comparisons between the three sites). These results suggest that the prefrontal cortex is 








Figure 2. Task. (A) Trial sequence. Each trial began with short fixation (500 ms) 
followed by the presentation of an oriented Gabor patch (100 ms). Subjects had to 
simultaneously indicate the tilt (left/right) of the Gabor patch and their confidence 
on a 1-4 scale. (B) Timeline of TMS delivery. TMS was given as a train of three 
pulses with inter-pulse interval of 100 ms. The first pulse was delivered 250 ms after 
onset of the stimulus. Subjects had a mean response time of ~950 ms.  
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3.1 TMS Effect on Confidence 
Based on our hypothesis regarding the functions of DLPFC and aPFC in confidence 
generation, we predicted that DLPFC TMS, but not aPFC TMS, would affect subjects’ 
overall confidence level. The results were consistent with this prediction. Indeed, a one-
way repeated measures ANOVA with factor TMS site (S1, DLPFC, and aPFC) 
demonstrated a significant effect of TMS location on confidence (F(2,17) = 3.68, P = 0.04; 
Figure 3). Pairwise comparisons showed a significant decrease in confidence for DLPFC 
TMS compared to S1 TMS (difference = 0.09, t(17) = 3.19, P = 0.005). No significant 
difference was found for comparisons between S1 TMS and aPFC TMS (difference = 0.03, 
t(17) = 0.83, P = 0.4), implying that overall confidence level was affected only after DLPFC 
stimulation. The difference in confidence between DLPFC TMS and aPFC TMS was 
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numerically larger than the difference between S1 TMS and aPFC TMS but did not reach 




Figure 3. TMS effect on overall confidence level. TMS to DLPFC decreased 
average confidence while TMS to aPFC did not affect the overall confidence level. 
The left error bars represent the within-subject standard errors for comparisons 
with S1 (the error bar for S1 is the same as the one for DLPFC) and are indicative 
of statistical significance. The right error bars represent the between-subject 
standard errors and are not indicative of the statistical significance (instead, they 
show the overall variability in confidence across subjects). n.s. not significant, ** 
P < 0.01. 
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3.2 TMS Effect on Metacognitive Ability 
Based on our hypothesis regarding the functions of DLPFC and aPFC in confidence 
generation, we predicted that aPFC TMS, but not DLPFC TMS, would affect subjects’ 
metacognitive ability. To test this prediction, we used Mratio as a measure of the quality of 
metacognition (Maniscalco and Lau, 2012). However, a one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA with factor TMS site (S1, DLPFC, and aPFC) on Mratio scores showed no main 
effect of TMS location on metacognitive ability (F(2,17) = 0.3, P = 0.74).  
In contrast to these results, previous studies showed that offline TMS to aPFC 
increased metacognitive scores (Rahnev et al., 2016; Ryals et al., 2016). Therefore, it is 
possible that the effects of TMS to aPFC become apparent only after a more sustained 
period of inhibition. To test this possibility, we examined whether metacognitive ability 
differed between the first and second halves of test blocks. We performed a 2 (time: first 
vs. second half of test blocks) X 3 (TMS site: S1, DLPFC, and aPFC) repeated measures 
ANOVA on Mratio values and found a significant interaction between time and TMS site 
(F(2,1) = 3.9, P = 0.03; Figure 4). Further analyses revealed a significant increase in Mratio 
for the second half (compared to the first half) of test blocks after aPFC TMS (difference 
= 0.22, t(17) = -2.44, P = 0.03) but not after S1 TMS (difference = -0.06, t(17) = 0.75, P = 
0.47) or DLPFC TMS (difference = -0.12, t(17) = 1.27, P = 0.22). Critically, the difference 
in Mratio between the two halves of test blocks was significantly larger for aPFC TMS 
compared to both S1 TMS (difference = 0.28, t(17) = 2.4, P = 0.028) and DLPFC TMS 
(difference = 0.34, t(17) = 2.81, P = 0.012). Therefore, TMS increased metacognitive 




We verified that the changes in Mratio were not driven by changes in the primary 
task performance d’. We performed a two-way repeated measures ANOVA on d’ with time 
and TMS location as factors. The results indicated no significant interaction between time 
Figure 4. TMS effect on metacognitive ability. TMS to aPFC increased 
metacognitive ability for the second half, compared to the first half, of test 
blocks. No such effect was observed for S1 TMS or DLPFC TMS. 
Metacognitive ability was operationalized as Mratio (Maniscalco and Lau, 2012). 
∆Mratio is the change in Mratio from the first half to the second half of a block. 
The left error bars represent the within-subject standard errors for 
comparisons with S1 (the error bar for S1 is the same as the one for aPFC) and 
are indicative of statistical significance. The right error bars represent the 
within-subject standard errors for comparisons between the first half and 
second half of blocks and are not indicative of the statistical significance. n.s. 
not significant, * P < 0.05. 
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and TMS location (F(2,1) = 1.56, P = 0.22). Further, we verified with a paired t-test that 
the change in d’ from the first half to the second half of the blocks was not significantly 
different between aPFC and the control site S1 (t(17) = 1.47, P = 0.16). Instead, a paired t-
test showed that this difference was significant for meta-d’, such that the change in meta-
d’ from the first half to the second half of the blocks was significantly greater for aPFC 
than S1 (t(17) = 2.27, P = 0.037). 
Similarly, we verified that the changes in Mratio were not driven by changes in 
confidence. A two-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of time on confidence (F(1,17) = 
14.8, P = 0.001) driven by a confidence decrease across all three TMS sites. Critically, the 
interaction between time and TMS location was non-significant (F(2,1) = 0.42, P = 0.66). 
A paired t-test showed that the decrease in confidence from first to second half of blocks 
was not significantly different between aPFC and the control site S1 (t(17) = 0.49, P = 
0.63).  
These additional results indicate that changes in d’ and confidence between the two 
halves of the blocks were similar across the TMS conditions and the observed effect of 
TMS on Mratio for aPFC cannot be explained by these variables. 
 
3.3 Simulating TMS Effects with a Hierarchical Confidence Generation Model 
The results above confirmed our prediction that disrupting DLPFC would affect 
average confidence, while disrupting aPFC would affect metacognitive ability. This 
prediction was based on the hypothesis that DLPFC reads out the strength of the sensory 
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signal and relays it to aPFC, which translates it into a confidence judgment by also 
incorporating non-perceptual factors. To test whether these mechanistic effects can indeed 
reproduce our results, we implemented them in simulations of a computational model of 
confidence generation.  
The model that we developed is based on the common assumption of the existence 
of independent sensory and metacognitive noise (Mueller and Weideman, 2008; De 
Martino et al., 2013; Rahnev et al., 2016; Bang et al., 2017; van den Berg et al., 2017). The 
two noise stages lead to separate representations for object- and meta-level judgments 
(Figure 5A). At the object level, the stimulus is corrupted by sensory noise and the 
resulting signal is used to make a perceptual decision. To make the confidence judgment, 
the signal strength from the object level is read out at the meta level. The final confidence 
decision is based on the sensory readout, as well as other factors such as the history of 
confidence responses (Rahnev et al., 2015), perceived attentional state, etc. We modeled 
all of these influences collectively as the addition of metacognitive noise.  
Within this architecture, our proposed effects of inhibiting DLPFC and aPFC can be 
operationalized as DLPFC TMS affecting the strength of the sensory readout, and aPFC 
TMS affecting the level of metacognitive noise (Figure 5A; boxed equations). 
Quantitatively, we modeled the effect of TMS to DLPFC as a loss of the sensory readout 
at the meta level and the effect of TMS on aPFC as a decrease in metacognitive noise (see 
Methods).   
Simulations of our computational model faithfully reproduced the TMS effects for 
both overall confidence level (Figure 5B) and metacognitive ability (Figure 5C). 
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Therefore, within this established architecture of hierarchical confidence generation, our 
TMS results can be recreated by assuming a role for DLPFC in the reading out the sensory 
signal strength at the meta level, and a role for aPFC in making the final confidence 

















Effect of DLPFC TMS
|
Effect of aPFC TMS 
CB
Figure 5. A computational model of confidence generation. (A) The sensory 
signal (𝐫𝐬𝐞𝐧𝐬) available at the decision level is read out (𝐫𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐨𝐮𝐭) to the 
metacognitive level and additional noise (𝛔𝐦𝐞𝐭𝐚) is added before obtaining 
the confidence signal (𝐫𝐦𝐞𝐭𝐚). The perceptual decision is based on the 
sensory signal 𝐫𝐬𝐞𝐧𝐬, while the confidence judgment is based on the 
confidence signal 𝐫𝐦𝐞𝐭𝐚. Consistent with the hypothesized roles of DLPFC 
and aPFC in confidence computation, we modelled the effect of DLPFC 
TMS as a signal loss from the readout (quantified as 𝚫𝐫𝐬𝐞𝐧𝐬), and the effect 
of aPFC TMS as lowered metacognitive noise (quantified as 𝚫𝛔𝐦𝐞𝐭𝐚). (B-
C) Model simulations show that decreasing the magnitude of the readout 
decreases the overall confidence level (panel B) but does not influence 
metacognitive ability (panel C). Conversely, decreasing the amount of 
metacognitive noise in the second half of test blocks has a small effect on 
average confidence (panel B) but a large effect on increasing metacognitive 
ability difference between the first and second half of blocks (panel C). 
These results mirror the effects of TMS to DLPFC and aPFC in our data 
(see Figures 3 and 4). 
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CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION 
We sought to determine the distinct roles of subregions of the prefrontal cortex in visual 
metacognition. Previous research identified the dorsolateral and anterior prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC and aPFC) as critical to metacognitive computations but a mechanistic 
understanding of their functions in confidence judgments is still lacking (Shimamura, 
2000a; Fleming and Dolan, 2012). We proposed a neural mechanism for confidence 
computation where DLPFC reads out the sensory signal strength and relays it to aPFC, 
while aPFC makes the confidence judgment by integrating this readout with non-perceptual 
factors. Based on this architecture, we predicted that disrupting DLPFC would affect 
average confidence (without affecting metacognitive ability), while disrupting aPFC would 
affect metacognitive ability (without affecting confidence). A causal intervention with 
online TMS confirmed these predictions. Further, we simulated a confidence generation 
model that incorporated our hypothesized neural mechanism and successfully reproduced 
the observed behavioral results. These findings establish the existence of independent 
causal contributions of DLPFC and aPFC to confidence generation and suggest specific 
mechanistic roles for these prefrontal sites. Further, they suggest that a significant portion 
of confidence computation in PFC takes place 250-450 ms following stimulus onset. 
 
4.1 Role of DLPFC in Confidence Generation 
Our experiment tested the hypothesis that the role of DLPFC in confidence 
computation is to read out the strength of the sensory signal and relay it to aPFC. We 
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derived this hypothesis from previous studies, which found that DLPFC activity is related 
to the level of confidence but not to metacognitive ability (Fleck et al., 2005; Henson et al., 
2000; Lau & Passingham, 2006). This proposed function of DLPFC in reading out the 
sensory signal strength is consistent with the view that DLPFC maintains, reroutes, and 
facilitates manipulations of sensory information (Shimamura, 2000b; Fleming and Dolan, 
2012).  
The correlation between DLPFC activity and confidence level has received different 
interpretations. Henson et al. (2000) hypothesized that DLPFC activity reflects retrieval 
monitoring in a memory task. Fleck et al. (2005) suggested a general role for DLPFC in 
information monitoring during decision making. Finally, Lau & Passingham (2006) 
theorized that DLPFC plays a role in conscious perception. Our proposal – that the role of 
DLPFC in confidence computations is to read out the strength of the sensory signal – is not 
necessarily at odds with these previous theories. Instead, here we specify a precise 
computational role for DLPFC in the domain of confidence generation.  
There has been some controversy about whether DLPFC is involved more directly 
in confidence computation. Rounis et al. (2010) delivered bilateral TBS to DLPFC and 
reported a decrease in mean visibility as well as metacognitive performance. These findings 
have been controversial with Bor et al. (2017) arguing that they could not replicate them, 
while Ruby et al. (2017) disputing Bor et al.’s exclusion criteria and arguing that the 
original effects replicate under different exclusion criteria. While our study certainly has 
implications about the role of DLPFC in metacognition, it is not clear whether it can be 
used to inform the above debate. Indeed, both studies above (Bor et al., 2017; Rounis et 
al., 2010) targeted a relatively posterior portion of DLPFC, while we targeted a relatively 
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anterior DLPFC region. DLPFC is anatomically large and it is likely that its different sub-
regions have different functions. Other important differences between ours and the two 
studies above include the use of an online vs. offline TMS protocol, unilateral vs. bilateral 
stimulation, and confidence vs. visibility ratings with each of these factors making direct 
comparisons difficult. 
 
4.2 Role of aPFC in Confidence Generation 
Our experiment tested the hypothesis that the role of aPFC in confidence 
computation is to decide the exact value of the confidence rating based on both the sensory 
readout relayed by DLPFC and other, non-perceptual factors. In line with this hypothesis, 
many previous studies have found a link between aPFC and metacognitive ability (Fleming 
et al., 2010, 2012b, 2014; Yokoyama et al., 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013; Rahnev et al., 
2016; Ryals et al., 2016; Allen et al., 2017). Our proposal that aPFC is the seat of 
metacognitive computation is also consistent with the view that aPFC is at the highest level 
in the cognitive and perceptual decision-making hierarchy (Badre and D’Esposito, 2009; 
Fleming and Dolan, 2012; Rahnev, 2017). 
A wide range of higher-order functions in the domains of memory, cognition, and 
perceptual decision making have been attributed to aPFC. These functions include top-
down manipulations of working memory representations, switching between task sets, 
attentional allocation to sub-goals, and relational integration (Koechlin et al., 1999; Kaas 
et al., 2007; Domenech and Koechlin, 2015; Lara and Wallis, 2015; Parkin et al., 2015). 
Ramnani & Owen (2004) integrate these theories into a common framework which 
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proposes that aPFC recruitment facilitates the coordination of information processing from 
separate mental processes towards a higher goal. This view is fully consistent with our 
theory’s implication of aPFC in generating metacognitive computations. Indeed, assessing 
the confidence in one’s own perceptual decisions requires the integration of both perceptual 
and non-perceptual factors (Fleming & Dolan, 2012).  
We found that TMS influenced metacognitive ability only for the second half of trials 
within a block. It appears that a sustained period of inhibition may be required in order to 
influence metacognitive ability. Indeed, previous studies that successfully manipulated 
metacognitive ability (Rahnev et al., 2016; Ryals et al., 2016) employed offline TMS, 
which involves a sustained period of stimulation. More research is needed to determine 
whether TMS may interact differently with the unique cytoarchitectonic characteristics of 
aPFC (Semendeferi et al., 2001).  
Disrupting the activity of aPFC during confidence computation improved 
metacognitive performance. While such an improvement appears surprising at first, it is 
consistent with previous studies that found increases in metacognitive ability after offline 
TMS to aPFC (Rahnev et al., 2016; Ryals et al., 2016). One possible explanation for this 
increased ability is that aPFC TMS increased the attentional resources for the confidence 
decision. However, increased attentional resources could be expected to also lead to 
increases in d’ and confidence but aPFC TMS had no effect on either of these measures. 
Another possibility is that TMS might have inhibited the influence of certain factors that 
are detrimental to metacognition. For example, people consider their confidence history 
while making a confidence judgement, a phenomenon called confidence leak (Rahnev et 
al., 2015). Confidence ratings may also be contaminated by other factors such as arousal 
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(Allen et al., 2016), action fluency (Fleming et al., 2015), etc. The use of these extra factors 
generally decreases metacognitive ability in laboratory settings (Rahnev et al., 2015). 
Therefore, the improvement of metacognitive ability with aPFC TMS in our study may 
stem from the reduced use of some of these non-perceptual factors in confidence 
generation. 
 
4.3 Computational Model  
We built a computational model that instantiates the hypothesized neural mechanism 
regarding the roles of DLPFC and aPFC. It is important to note that while the TMS data 
provide support for the proposed neural mechanism, our experiment was not designed to 
corroborate the computational model directly. Instead, the role of the computational model 
was to verify that the substantive claims made by our neural mechanism could indeed lead 
to the pattern of behavioral results that we observed. We have explored the plausibility of 
our computational model elsewhere (Bang et al., 2017).   
We modeled the effect of TMS on aPFC and DLPFC as a decrease in metacognitive 
noise and a decrease of signal in the sensory readout (𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡), respectively. The modeling 
choice for aPFC TMS is natural given that, within our model, metacognitive ability is 
controlled by the metacognitive noise parameter. However, the effects of DLPFC TMS on 
decreased confidence can also be explained as a shift in the confidence criteria. The reason 
we do not favor this explanation is because it is unclear why TMS would shift the criteria 
in one direction and not the other. Specifically, we are not aware of any mechanism that 
predicts that TMS would increase the confidence criteria (in order to decrease confidence). 
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Instead, our explanation –  that TMS causes a loss of signal, which leads to a confidence 
decrease – relates more naturally to the expected effect of TMS, which is to disrupt neural 
activity. 
 
4.4 Conclusion  
Our results show that TMS produced distinct effects on confidence measures 
depending on which prefrontal site was stimulated: TMS to DLPFC decreased confidence, 
while TMS to aPFC increased metacognitive ability for the second half of the experimental 
blocks. This dissociation confirms our hypothesis that DLPFC and aPFC have distinct roles 
in visual metacognition. Further, it supports our hypothesized neural mechanism, 
according to which DLPFC reads out the sensory signal strength and relays it to aPFC for 
the confidence computation. Simulations of a confidence generation model based on our 
neural mechanism reproduced the observed TMS effects and thus corroborated this 
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